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Abstract 
The concept of language is nothing but a linguistic simplification. It encompasses 
many realities. Depending on the language spoken, the reality of language is denoted with 
words belonging to different grammatical categories. The reality implicit in these 
grammatical categories involves a particular mode of thinking, prompted by the conception 
of things in accordance with a corresponding mode of being. Because of this it is necessary, 
then, to distinguish the concept of language as something different from the reality of 
language and determine the reality or degree of reality of it. 
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Introduction 
The conception of things has to do with what Coseriu called the original knowledge of 
speakers243, that is, linguistic knowledge. In this you have to separate, at least, two aspects: a) 
those aspects of linguistic knowledge having to do with language use, and b) those having to 
do with beliefs in the conception of things. Beliefs, transmitted through the tradition in the 
technique of speaking by the different languages, constitute the foundation in the conception 
of things by speakers. Speaking is speaking, saying and knowing. Human subjects speak 
because they have something to say, and they say something because they are both free and 
historical to know, conceive of things, say and speak. A human subject is at the same time 
absolute, that is, free and creative, and historical, a subject who performs himself in 
participation with others in history, thus contingent and limited. Because of this, a human 
subject creates his mode of thinking, necessarily free and participated, that is, creative and 
historical.  
The purpose of a linguistic theory is to understand what language really is. To do this 
we must base our theory on the ultimate reality we may find in language analysis, the radical 
reality244. The same as with the act of knowing245, a theory is nothing but something we add 
to the things we apprehend and find in the world. Language is nothing but the reality lived, 
intuited, created, acquired, performed, used and spoken of by speakers.  
 
Modes of being and modes of thinking 
The concept of Being in language study. 
In this paper I want to pose the problem of language from the ultimate and most 
radical foundation of it. My intention is to answer the following question: What is language? 
A linguist when he wants to study language meets a great difficulty sometimes invincible: his 
original conception about language is not scientific but taken from his linguistic background. 
A linguist as a speaker, whatever his language is, has a particular intuitive conception about 
                                                          
243 Cf. Coseriu 1988: 66-67; Coseriu 1992: 218. 
244 Cf. § 3. 
245 I would rather use act of knowing other than act of knowledge to mean that knowledge is active. 
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language and how it functions, especially in the aspects concerning his native language. The 
interest the linguist feels to know about language makes him be attentive, as a speaker, to all 
details in language use in a task lasting all over his life. As a consequence when he tries to 
study language in a justified manner, that is, as a linguist, he will probably try to justify his 
original ideas, cultivated by him all over his life. But these ideas are nothing but beliefs, 
something having emerged in us without any rational support on our part246. In this sense, the 
beliefs in force in our tradition of speaking, that is, in our native language, can make us adopt 
them as if they were reality itself. All languages, any one on its part, transmit a particular 
conception about things in the world. One of the most important things in that world is 
language. 
In order to avoid all possible beliefs in language study, the linguist must determine if 
language really exists, if language can be verified; he must analyse language to know the 
degree of reality of it; if language merely manifests itself and how and what it manifests itself 
in. Language manifests itself in the speaking behaviour of its users. It is nothing abstract but 
real, the language used by speakers. In this sense, and bearing in mind that all speakers bear 
with them beliefs, we should distinguish three types of behaviour in speakers. First, speakers 
live their language, that is, they identify themselves with the techniques of expression and 
modes of conceiving of things in their language. Second, their language and the techniques of 
expression in it are historical systems of speaking, that is, something contingent proper of this 
or that language, not of language. And third, speakers usually speak of things—thus giving 
explanation to linguistic facts—in accordance with the mode of thinking in their speech 
community, their native language. 
The techniques of expression of a language bear with them a particular conception of 
the world, that is, a mode of thinking, a series of beliefs accepted by speakers. As a 
consequence the original conception of things by linguists is structured in accordance with 
the original conception of things in force in their native language. Because of this the original 
conception of linguists must be analysed, revised, rejected or justified. Linguists must 
radically separate language use from the mode of thinking in their language, that is, they must 
separate the linguistic behaviour of speakers, linguistic knowledge, something manifesting 
itself in language use, and the mode of thinking implicit in the explanation of things and thus 
in linguistic facts by speakers. 
Due to the beliefs transmitted by the western languages the mode of conceiving of 
things in the western world is peculiar of our civilization. This fact goes beyond language use 
but it is the support for the conception of things reflected in language use. It constitutes the 
mode of thinking of westerners, the mode of conceiving of things based on a particular 
conception of what Being is. The mere fact of referring to language with a noun makes us 
conceive of the reality of it as something really existing, something there, something 
independent from anything else, thus something objective as if it was an entity. The 
conception of language would be different if the reality of language was denoted by a verb. 
Compare the different degree of reality in the words language and speaking. As a matter of 
fact, in Greek and Latin the reality denoted by the concept language was denoted by a verb or 
an adverb, categories of words used to express different modes of being, an activity or the 
mode of an activity. For Coseriu, this way of conceiving of the reality of language related 
much more exactly to the way of being of real language. In Greek you could find expressions 
as attikísein (speaking Attic), barbarísein (speaking Barbarian) hellenísein (speaking 
Greek)247.  
                                                          
246 Cf. Ortega y Gasset 2005: 172. 
247 Cf. Coseriu 1992: 78-79.  
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But in Latin this type of referring to the reality of language is even more exact since 
the activity of speaking appears separated from its mode: latine loqui, graece loqui (speaking 
in the mode of speaking of old Latin people, or the Greek)248. 
For a modern westerner249, the reality of language is thought of as if it was something 
really existing. In this sense it is fundamental to answer the following question, does 
language exist? (or, how does it exist?), Can language be verified? How does language 
manifest itself? The answer to these questions constitutes what we call the degree of reality of 
things (the degree of reality of language, in our case). 
 
Modes of thinking: the concept of substantive being 
In the history of Thought—referring this expression to western thought—the concept 
of Being, that is, the concept of how things are to be conceived of, the mode of being—and 
thus the mode of thinking—, varies largely due to the intervention of the great thinkers in the 
western philosophy. The original and underlying conception of things in western languages is 
what we call the substantive being250, a concept in force all around the Mediterranean, 
transmitted by our languages251. 
The first Greek thinkers, Parmenides of Elea and Heraclitus of Ephesus, 6th century 
BC, conceived of things as if they really existed. Being, for them, was something existing as 
opposing Nought thus something objective. Parmenides said that you cannot say anything 
about Being, the only thing you can say is that “Being is and it is impossible for it not to be”; 
and together with this he added, “Non-Being is not and you cannot even speak of it”252. That 
is, Being and Non-being (=Nought) have the same degree of reality, they both existed at the 
same level or, said in accordance with Heraclitus’ conception: Being is in opposition to 
Nought253. For Parmenides, Being is one, eternal, immobile, it has no beginning or end254. In 
the history of Thought this conception by Parmenides, meant attributing lógos to reality, that 
is, dispossessing reality of the subjective, thus becoming lógos255 (=content).  
For Heraclitus of Ephesus, Being is nothing static or inert but something opposing its 
contrary. I am in as much as I oppose the world: the world opposes me and obliges me to act 
in opposition to it. Without the world I would not be256. Heraclitus´s conception meant the 
introduction of lógos in reality as well, dispossessing reality of the subjective. With this lógos 
was common257, that is, something in all human beings. 
                                                          
248 Ibid. 
249 At least for English, Spanish and French speakers. 
250 Cf. Ortega y Gasset 1971: 38.  
251 The major manifestations of substantive being in the western world can be found in the following three facts: 
a) the concept of science. Science in the West is linked to technics and technology, that is, science aims at 
dominating the object of study, that is, things in the world. In contrast to this, you can consider the concept 
of science in the Asian world, connected to individual happiness, that is, science aims at dominating human 
passions to be happy. From the point of view of a theory of knowledge you can see that in the West science 
is objective; in the East it is subjective; b) monotheism. The three monotheist religions were born around the 
Mediterranean. Monotheist religions are absolute, that is, every one claims to be the true one; and c) things 
are conceived of as if they existed, for example, nature, something encompassing many things, a “linguistic 
simplification” of all the things and aspects of things making up what we know as nature.  
252 Cf. Ferrater Mora, Diccionario de filosofía. 
253 Cf. Ortega y Gasset 1992: 217. 
254 Cf. Ferrater Mora, Diccionario de filosofía.  
255 Cf. Ortega y Gasset, Obras Completas, IX: 1063. 
256 “Being in Heraclitus is not quietness or anything inert—[…] Being is contrapositive confrontation. And any 
thing is in as much as it confronts, nothing possible unless the thing in question makes its opposite act. I am 
in as much as I oppose my resistance, the World—which on resisting lets me and obliges me to act in 
opposition. Without it I would not be—. Without its resisting there would not be my insisting”. (José Ortega 
y Gasset, 1994: 417: 264) (my translation). 
257 Cf. Ortega y Gasset, Obras completas, IX: 1063. 
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This mode of thinking, the concept of substantive being258, created innumerable 
metaphysical problems, one of them, the problem of movement: being cannot change because 
changing involves that something not existing previously now exists. 
Before this untenable situation from the level of the real, Aristotle, 4th, c. BC, reacted 
trying to conciliate both previous conceptions, adding a new one. For Aristotle, the concept 
of Being, ἐνἐργεια ὀν, was at the same time something being in itself (ἐνἐργεια κατ᾽ ἐργον) 
thus not needing of anything else to be (=substance); something executing itself (ἐνἐργεια 
κατ᾽ ἐνἐργειαν); and something being the potency of its own performance (ἐνἐργεια κατἀ 
δὑναμιν). In spite of this, ἐνἐργεια ὀν keeps on its original character: it is something there and 
something objective259.  
The concept of substantive being, in force in Greek and Mediterranean cultures—
Parmenides, did nothing but formulating what was in force in his speech community—has 
become the mode of conceiving of things in the western civilization, a concept of Being not 
in force in other parts of the world outside the western civilization260. 
Substantive being applied to language makes us think of language as something there, 
something opposing its contrary (=silence), not needing of anything else to be, something 
objective, that is, as an entity. In this sense language is thought to constitute part of the world, 
apt to be described in itself. As a consequence, you can take language as the starting point for 
its study. As a matter of fact most modern theories about language start with this conception 
of language261. 
 
The modern mode of being: the Cartesian mode of thinking 
Descartes (1596-1650) revised the mode of thinking of substantive being, and 
proposed the “I” and “Thought” as the radical reality in the mode of thinking. He stated, 
“cogito, ergo sum”. That is, because I can think I can conclude that I am. In this way and 
after him, Being is something manifesting in thought based on three pillars, intuition262, 
reason and deduction. To intuit, for Descartes, is realizing necessary connections in things 
thus appearing evident263, that is, executing reason in the contemplation of things. When you 
analyse concepts and find out new connections, then you have deduction, a new function of 
the mind different from intuition264 and reason. With this conception the character of 
philosophy changed: before Descartes philosophy asked for Being—what is Being?—but 
after Descartes philosophy asked for the way how Being is known—how is Being known? 
                                                          
258 Cf. Ortega y Gassset, Obras Completas, VII: 339:  “The most characteristic expression of the Hellenic 
concept of being is being as a substance, an immobile and invariable being. Even in the ultimate substance, 
the beginning of all change and movement, in the Aristotelian God you can find an Entity moving everything 
but not moving Itself” (my translation).  
259 The concept of Being by Aristotle, ἐνἐργεια ὀν, has given the base for different interpretations in 20th 
century linguistics. For Coseriu, the concept of Being by Aristotle, founded on the conception by Wilhelm 
von Humboldt, is the base to interpret language as free activity, ἐνἐργεια (Cf. Martínez del Castillo 2012: 
164-167). For Chomsky, trying to interpret Descartes, this concept of being is the base to conclude that 
language is innate (Cf. Martínez del Castillo 2010: 227-234). 
260 The concept of Substantive Being does not exist in the tradition of Hopi, people living in Little Colorado 
valley (cf. Whorf 1956: 258); nor does it exist in Ewe, a language in Togo (cf. Benveniste 2007, vol. I: 71-
72), or in primitive Hebrew (cf. Boman 1954, apud Ferrater Mora, Diccionario de filosofía). 
261 As a general rule linguistics in the 20th century is based on this conception about language (cf. Martínez del 
Castillo, 2012). 
262 For Ortega y Gasset, the modern way of thinking introduced by Descartes is based on analogy. For him, 
analogy is the foundation of science. With analogy individual items are used as correlates thus making 
possible to create an image of the class those individual items belong to (cf. Ortega y Gasset, 1992: 148 and 
ff.). 
263 Cf. Ortega y Gasset, 1992: 328. 
264 Cf. Ortega y Gasset, 1992: 331. 
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So, today the concept of Being transmitted by our languages (substantive being) 
radically opposes the way of thinking introduced by Descartes and philosophy after him. 
Speakers of western languages refer to the reality of language as something there, something 
existing in itself, something objective, independent from the reality it appears in, that is, 
something with no or little connection with its creators, speakers. As a consequence and 
because of this, you can pose the metaphysical problem of asking if language exists or if it is 
something created by the human thought. 
A metaphysical problem is the one posed in terms of contraposition of the material, 
given to us by our senses, and the mental. In the apprehension of things, apprehension of 
Being, our senses play an important role. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) established two 
sources of knowledge, sensibility and intellect, also called, respectively, receptivity and 
spontaneity. For Kant, knowledge is performed as the synthesis of both faculties, that is, as a 
unification of the multiple forms of sensibility by means of the intellect through forms a priori. 
The synthesis of sensibility and intellect is possible because of imagination. Imagination is a 
creative force present in the base of both receptivity and spontaneity. In the synthesis of 
knowledge made by imagination, both faculties converge265. 
Metaphysical problems can be summarized in the problem of knowledge: What do we 
know? Do we know because of our senses? What do our senses contribute with? Does Man 
know only through his senses or does he create what he says he knows? At first sight, we can 
see that human knowledge does not relate to the thing given by our senses. In order to know, 
it is necessary at least to change the thing given by our senses and add something to it. 
The double reality of knowledge stated by Kant is present in language and its 
verification. We as speakers can verify the existence of language in our daily life. We live, 
intuit, create, acquire, perform and use language. In this sense language is real. But, on the 
other hand, language in as much as it appears in the word ‘language’ and the concept 
“language” poses the problem of its existence and verification. Language cannot be verified 
in itself. This means that language does not exist or at least that language does not have 
concrete existence. Language is good for speaking, saying, knowing and thinking, good for 
us at manifesting ourselves to others and good for others at manifesting themselves to us. 
Humans cannot do anything unless through language even when they are alone or think. In 
this sense, language exists. The problem is to explain how language exists and what extent 
language is real. The problem with language study thus is to determine the degree of reality it 
has. The reality of language is not simple but complex. It must be guessed out and devised. 
The first thing to do then is to study language as it manifests itself. We cannot take language 
as constituting an easy reality. Language is a phenomenon (from φαíνω=make things clear, 
φανεἶσθαι=show, exhibit oneself, manifest oneself), that is, something existing but mentally, 
manifesting itself in something else266. 
 
Modes of thinking in the 20th century 
In the history of Thought different modes of thinking have manifested in the 20th 
century. We can summarize them in three: 
a) Being as a phenomenon, that is, Being as manifesting itself. Things are things in so 
far as they are useful, that is, as they play a function. A chair, for example, made in wood, if 
we burn to warm up it is not a chair (=a piece of furniture to sit on): it is firewood. Things 
manifest themselves in front of us; 
                                                          
265 Cf. Di Cesare, 1999: 35-36. 
266 This is the interpretation of lógos by M. Heidegger, cf. Heidegger, 2002: 37; cf. also, § 2. 
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b) Executive Being, the mode of Being in which you live things, thus things acting on 
you267. Something is in the way it is because it executes what it is. Light is something I need, 
thus being what I expect it to be; nevertheless I shall not consider or mention it unless it is 
missing. 
c) Being as reality. Something is in terms of the action I may execute on it. For Ortega y 
Gasset, reality means sheer action of the circumstance on me and me on the circumstance268. 
Language is nothing but the thing I create, acquire and use. Its reality consists in my creating 
and using it. In this sense things are in so far as they relate to the perspective cognizant269 
subjects impose on them.  
Language for the speaking subject is to know how to speak, that is, it is the linguistic 
knowledge the speaking subject intuits, lives, creates, acquires, performs, uses and even 
speaks of. For the listener, language basically is understanding. The speaker and the listener 
live language but differently. Since the speech act is made up of both the speaker and the 
listener, relieving each other in their respective roles, and since living is conscious, language 
is both speaking and understanding, that is, διἀλογος270. 
But, on the contrary, for a linguist, language is merely a cognizant object, that is, an 
object conceived of and apt to constitute the object of a theory. At the same time, if for 
speakers, language is a unitary reality they “live”, for a linguist, it may be something made up 
of many aspects. Linguists usually separate different levels constituted by sounds, words and 
the formation and combination of words, meaning, the production of speech, texts and the 
content created beyond meaning (saying). Every one of these levels can constitute a branch of 
knowledge thus forming different disciplines, independent from one another, and to a certain 
extent independent from the initial conception of language: phonology, morphology, syntax, 
semantics, text linguistics and linguistics of saying.  
The problem when studying language is analysing what the reality of it is, or what 
degree of reality it has. When you refer to language you denote a very vast and complex 
reality: a set of connections you must find out and separate. 
 
Language study as an act of knowing 
For a cognizant subject, to study something is an act of knowing. This is nothing but 
the attempt to capture the essence, consistency or reality of things. So we can see the 
following elements. First, the cognizant subject: human knowledge is active, something made 
by an intelligent and creative subject.  
Second, the object known. For Kant, knowledge is the unification of the thing given to 
you by your senses and the intellect through forms a priori. Forms a priori are those statements 
in the understanding of which you do not need experience. For forms a priori to be, it is 
necessary the synthetic connection of intuition271. Forms a priori are analytic, that is, the extent 
of the content of both the subject and the predicate is the same. For example, you can say 
5+7=12. Either if you count the sum in the subject with your fingers or a calculator you will see 
that the predicate is 12. Analytic statements are necessary and universal, something given in the 
                                                          
267 “The absolute reality is ‘my life’ consisting in […] pure execution” (Ortega y Gasset, 1992 [1984]: 127) (my 
translation). 
268 “Reality consists in purely acting the circumstance on me and me on the circumstance” (José Ortega y 
Gasset, 1992 [1984]: 127) (my translation). 
269 I’d rather use cognizant, intellective and cognizance other than cognitive and cognition. From my point of 
view the latter should be revised (cf. Martínez del Castillo 2008). 
270 “Saying, lógos, is nothing but the particular reaction of an individual life. Because of this, in strict terms, 
there are no argumentations but the one of a subject to another one. […] Saying, lógos, is extremely real, 
extremely human conversation, diálogos—διἀλογος—, argumentum hominis ad hominen. Dialogue is lógos 
from the point of view of the other, the one next to us” (Ortega y Gasset, 1987: 16) (my translation). 
271Cf. Kant, 2004: 7-52. 
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very formulation of them. However they are not evident, something you can verify if you 
operate with upper numbers.    
And third, the synthetic connection of intuition. In extensive statements, those in which 
the extent of the predicate goes beyond the thing stated in the subject, the synthesis consists 
in attributing necessity and universality to sensibility. That is, you add something mental not 
existing in the thing coming to you through your senses. The synthesis determines the 
conception of the object known just transformed and made into an image of itself because of 
imagination272. These are synthetic a priori statements. 
Synthetic a priori statements are based on analogy273. If you know a few examples from 
experience, all of them similar in their nature, reality, essence or consistency, you can assume 
that all items constituting the same class (or category) must have the same nature, reality, 
essence or consistency as the ones you primarily know. Synthetic a priori statements can even 
be made on the base of only an item. In both cases the particular items are made into the image 
of the class they represent274. The reason of this is that on the base of the few examples you 
experienced, you intuitively and based on analogy define the class of items they belong to. For 
example, Oil will float on water. This statement has a priori force in the synthesis made since 
you add universality and necessity to something you experienced as sporadic and temporary 
facts. The statement is not analytic but extensive and thought of a priori, a synthetic a priori 
statement275. 
The synthesis of sensibility and intellect is present in the formulation of theories. 
Synthetic a priori statements in science are usually called assumptions (=theory). You 
assume that the object known, once it is added necessity and universality, is in the way stated. 
Because of this the intellect will look for the execution of it in real things since the statement 
represents the image, that is, the essence of something real. In this sense a theory is the result 
of imagination, something invented by the scientist.  
In the synthesis being made the mode of thinking plays an important role. As we saw 
earlier, some modes of thinking, especially the substantive mode of being, constitute beliefs. 
Because of this, assumptions may be based on beliefs not formulated or analysed. So the 
major assignment when analysing a theory, or an act of knowing, is determining the ultimate 
reason prompting the formulation of the assumption. In this sense, the ultimate reason plays a 
function similar to what Ortega y Gasset calls the radical reality. 
  
The radical reality 
For Ortega y Gasset, human beings do not have a static mode of being. The human 
way of being is nothing prior to their birth, nothing given or made, but something to be made 
in struggle with the circumstance human subjects are in. The circumstance they are in is 
determined by the moment in history it occurs276. Any one of the many possible modes of 
being a human being finds constitutes a fundamental experience, which, once performed, 
may constitute a limitation and be the reason for a new one. Since human subjects are 
together-with-others277, that is, since they constitute society based on διἀλογος, language and 
the mode of thinking in force in a particular speech community are participated278. All human 
subjects living in a speech community at a particular moment of history have similar modes 
                                                          
272 Cf. Ibid. 
273 Cf. a discussion on the value of analogy in Ortega y Gasset, 1992: 226-30. 
274 Cf. José Ortega y Gasset, 1992 [1984]: 152. 
275 Cf. Kant, 2004: 47-52. 
276 Cf. Ortega y Gasset, 1996 [1979]: 236-237. 
277 Cf. Coseriu 2006: 44. 
278 Cf. Coseriu 1988: 43. 
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of thinking. They all share common279 modes of conceiving of things and the world. This 
constitutes the historical reason, for Ortega y Gasset280, and the condition of “otherness”281, 
for Coseriu.  
As a consequence, when you want to know about things in the world, you must look 
for the ultimate reason things are based on. This has to do with what Ortega y Gasset calls the 
radical reality. He says: 
We as human beings live in between a multitude of things and modes of being of things, real 
modes of being of those things. This obliges us to find out the ultimate reality or radical 
reality to be used as the meter to graduate all other things, in order to range them all rightly 
and assign them in Being, to make a hierarchy of them, to settle them down and establish 
them deep in Being282. 
In some way or another, our thought is structured. We can base our hierarchy of 
things known either by ourselves finding out the radical reality they are based on, or accept 
the hierarchy of things given to us in our historical tradition283. A linguist must find out the 
radical reality of language, or else he will accept the ultimate reason his historical mode of 
thinking bears with it. The radical reality cannot admit anything prior to it. The ultimate 
reason, as opposing the radical reality, since it was not thought but accepted, entirely depends 
on the conception you have about things, that is, on the mode of thinking and the implicit 
mode of Being, received from tradition.  
In order to find out the radical reality the question to be made is different in any case. 
For the mode of thinking of substantive being, the question is, does language exist? Can 
language be verified? On the contrary, for the modern mode of thinking, Being as it is 
intuited, the question is, how is language universal and necessary in humans? For the 
executive mode of being, the question is, what is language for speakers? What is language 
for me as a speaker? For the mode of thinking of being as manifesting itself, the question is, 
how does language manifests itself? Is language anything autonomous or something being 
given in something else? And finally, for the mode of thinking of being as reality, the 
question is, is language real? What is the degree of reality of language? What is the radical 
reality language is based on? 
In the following example we can see the role of the ultimate reason, as opposing the 
radical reality. Language, for a particular linguist, may be a mysterious284 faculty285, a 
common human possession, varying little across the species286, something you can describe 
only in the process of language learning287. Because of this language must answer the innate 
schemata of learning288 thus revealing linguistic universals289 and universal grammar290. As a 
consequence language is innate291 and natural292.  
 The linguist in question may have experienced that he cannot explain language in a 
particular moment and then he may have felt entitled to conclude that “language is 
                                                          
279 Cf. Coseriu 1988: 70. 
280 Cf. Ortega y Gasset 1992: 148-50. 
281 Cf. also Coseriu 2006: 44. 
282 Cf. Ortega y Gasset, 1996: 40-41. 
283 Cf. Coseriu 1988: 70. 
284 Cf. Chomsky, 1992: 68; 1992: 70-71; 1992: 171; Chomsky, 2002: 59. 
285 Cf. Chomsky 1992: 55-56; Chomsky 2002: 47; Chomsky 2000: 87. 
286 Cf. Chomsky 2002: 47. 
287 Cf. Chomsky 1965: 27. 
288 Ibid. 
289 Ibid. 
290 Cf. Chomsky 1965: 25 and 27. 
291 Cf. Chomsky 1965: 25-27. 
292 Ibid. 
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mysterious”. With this assumption, the statement is not about the fact that an individual 
linguist once experienced the referred to difficulty, but a synthetic a priori statement, 
contemplating connections in it: necessity and universality (=language is and will always be 
mysterious). Once you have analysed the first assumption you may proceed in the same way 
with the other assumptions, namely, that language is a faculty, a common human possession, 
varying little across the species, something you can describe only in the process of language 
learning, there are linguistic universals revealing a universal grammar, and in consonance 
with them all, conclude that language is innate and natural. 
 The problem, then, is finding out whether these assumptions are true. Language, the 
subject in them all, does it exist? Can language be verified? 
 If you analyse them all you will see that they depend on something previously 
conceived of. For language to be mysterious, it must be something; for language to be a 
faculty, it must be something similar to other faculties, they all depending on organs; for 
language to belong to the human species, it must be something as well since a species 
manifests itself in individuals with a body; for those linguistic universals and universal 
grammar to exist, it is necessary that language should exist; for language to be learnt, it 
should exist, the same as those innate schemata. So you conceive of language as something in 
the human nature, something objective, existing in human psychology293 or the psychology of 
the mind294.  
 The ultimate reason for the existence of language thus is that language is something 
existing in itself and thus objective. But here the problem lies: is this conception real? If 
language is something objective and natural it must be verified in what it is. Is language 
verified in real terms? How can language be verified?  
 But language cannot be verified in itself. It can only be verified in speech acts. Prior 
to the conception of language as something existing in itself, it is the problems of the 
manifestation of language and the reality of language. Language and its manifestations are 
merely concepts, something got through abstraction. You will say language, a language, 
speech or a speech act, when you verify people speaking. At the same time it is the problem 
of reality of language or the degree of reality it has. And then when we know all this it is 
necessary to find out the radical reality language is based on.  
3.10. The radical reality of language cannot be but human subjects, who speak because they 
have something to say; say something because they define themselves before the 
circumstance they are in and compromise before this definition because they are able to 
know295. 
 
Conclusions 
 All modes of thinking and the implicit modes of being have to do with the original 
conception of language: 
a) Speakers intuit language (modern mode of thinking). 
b) Speakers live language (executive mode of thinking). 
c) For speakers, language is διἀλογος: activity and mode of speaking (mode of thinking 
of being as manifesting itself). 
d) Speakers create, acquire and use language to perform themselves as human (mode of 
thinking of being as reality). 
                                                          
293 Cf. Chomsky 1992: 57; Chomsky 1992: 124; Chomsky 1992: 126; Chomsky 2002: 61-64. 
294 Cf. Chomsky 2002: 61-64. 
295 Cf. Martínez del Castillo 2004. For Coseriu, the radical reality of language is the “speaking being” (cf. 
Coseriu 1985: 50). 
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e) Speakers speak of language as a series of entities: language, the English language, 
meanings, words, speech, speech act, speech sounds, the correct use of words, etc. 
(substantive mode of thinking). 
 Correspondingly, all modes of being are necessary in the study of language: 
a) Language study involves the creation of a theory, series of synthetic a priori 
statements (modern mode of being). 
b) Language study is the description of the linguistic behaviour of speakers, either 
individually or in participation with others in a speech community (executive being). 
c) Language study is nothing but the description of linguistic behaviour since human 
intelligence and freedom manifest themselves in language (being as manifesting) 
d) Language and all aspects in it are to be described in the degree of reality they have in 
terms of the radical reality they are based on (being as real). 
e) The description of language and its manifestations cannot be made unless they are 
conceived of as entities (substantive being). 
That is, human subjects live, intuit, create, acquire, perform, use and even speak of language. 
Language manifests itself in human freedom and intelligence. 
 Language is nothing but human subjects who know, define themselves before the 
circumstance they are in, compromise, say and speak thus making themselves human and 
manifesting themselves to others. 
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